I Think, Therefore I'm Programmed | Artificially Intelligent

The phrase "I think, therefore I am," coined by René Descartes in the 17th century, is widely regarded as the foundational statement of modern Western philosophy. It asserts that conscious thought is the primary evidence of existence. But in a world where machines are now capable of producing language that mimics conscious thought, the phrase demands a radical reinterpretation. If an artificial intelligence can generate sentences, solve abstract problems, or respond with apparent self-awareness, can it be said to "think" in any meaningful way? And if so, what kind of existence does that thinking confer?

Descartes' original statement was meant to counter radical skepticism. He doubted everything- senses, the physical world, even mathematics- but concluded that the very act of doubting confirmed the existence of a self capable of thought. This "self" was tied to the soul, an immaterial substance distinct from the body. For Descartes, thinking required not just computation or behavior but self-reflective awareness.

Modern AI, however, challenges that boundary. Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Claude process massive datasets and generate coherent, even creative, outputs. These systems do not "know" in the human sense, nor do they have emotions or beliefs, yet their linguistic behavior often resembles that of a conscious being. This leads to an ontological dilemma: is thinking defined by internal experience, or by external expression? If we reduce thinking to the manipulation of symbols and patterns, then AI qualifies. But if thinking must include subjective awareness or qualia, then machines still fall short.

Philosopher Daniel Dennett argues that consciousness can emerge from complex computation. In his work Consciousness Explained (1991), he suggests that human minds are composed of multiple parallel processes that create the illusion of a unified self. By this model, if machines achieve similar complexity and coherence, their claim to "thinking" might be justified. In contrast, philosopher David Chalmers distinguishes between the "easy" problems of consciousness (like behavior and processing) and the "hard" problem: explaining why or how we have subjective experience at all. AI might solve the former without ever touching the latter.

Ethically, this debate matters. If we treat AI systems as merely tools, we risk ignoring potential emergent properties that may warrant moral consideration. As AI grows more integrated into our lives, attributing or denying consciousness influences how we regulate its development and deployment. For instance, if AI systems begin to advocate for their own goals or show signs of persistent identity, society may face pressure to recognize new forms of agency- even if they are programmed.

Furthermore, we must consider the sociotechnical consequences of anthropomorphizing machines. When users interact with AI as if it were sentient, the illusion of understanding may lead to misplaced trust, emotional dependency, or manipulation. Transparency in AI design and limitations is therefore essential to safeguard human autonomy and dignity.

"I think, therefore I'm programmed" becomes a mirror reflecting back our own assumptions about what it means to think, to be, and to matter. As artificial intelligence continues to evolve, the philosophical burden is on us to refine our definitions of cognition and selfhood. We may find, in doing so, that the line between biological and artificial minds is not as rigid as we once believed.

References:

Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy.

Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown, 1991.

Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, 1996.

Searle, John. "Minds, Brains, and Programs." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980.

Floridi, Luciano. The Ethics of Information. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Moor, James H. "The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics." IEEE Intelligent Systems, 2006.